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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Natasha Lynn Bly appeals from the judgment entered upon her 
conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance, claiming the 
district court erred in denying her motion to suppress. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Detective Benson was in an area of Nampa with "an epidemic amount of 
drug activity." (Tr., p.8, Ls.18-25.) He located a vehicle registered to a Richard 
Olmos at the Super 8 Motel. (Tr., p.9, Ls.8-14.) Olmos had an active arrest 
warrant for "drug-related activity." (Id.) Although unsuccessful in locating Olmos 
in or around the motel, Detective Benson did observe a vehicle approach the 
motel with its occupants engaged in activity consistent with a "drug transaction." 
(Tr., p.9, L.16- p.10, L.14.) 
The detective also observed Bly leave the motel, come out to Olmos' 
vehicle and "exhibit[ ] some strange or suspicious activity getting in and out of 
the car several times." (Tr., p.10, Ls.17-21.) Bly then got into Olmos' car and 
drove it across the motel parking lot. (Tr., p.10, Ls.21-25.) After moving the 
vehicle, Bly went back into the motel and then came "immediately back out" and 
headed towards Olmos' vehicle. (Tr., p.11, Ls.3-13.) At that point, Detective 
Benson made contact with Bly, telling her to "hold on a minute." (Tr., p.13, Ls.7-
10.) 
Detective Benson asked Bly for her information, at which time he "could 
smell the distinct odor of burnt marijuana coming from her person." (Tr., p.13, 
1 
1 . ) also observed that Bly's speech was "a bit slurred" had 
eyes," as as heat on her tongue consistent 
marijuana , p.14, Ls.5-20.) Detective Benson asked Bly about the car she 
had driven across the parking lot and she indicated it belong to a man named 
Richard who had picked her up and brought her to the motel. (Tr., p.15, Ls.16-
25.) 
Detective Benson then physically detained Bly and did a preliminary 
search for weapons, at which time "it came to our understanding that she had 
some items [of drugs] on her." (Tr., p.17, Ls.11-19.) A female officer ultimately 
conducted a more thorough search of Bly's person and found 
methamphetamine. (Tr., p.17, Ls.11-21.) 
The state charged Bly with possession of a controlled substance. (R., 
pp.16-17.) Bly subsequently moved to exclude all evidence found based on her 
claim that the police had insufficient cause to detain and ultimately search her 
person. (R., pp.19-20.) The court agreed that Bly was in fact detained by law 
enforcement, but ruled that such detention was justified. (Tr., p.43, L.22 - p.47, 
L.5.) 
Bly entered a conditional plea of guilty to possession of a controlled 
substance, reserving her right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress. 
(R., pp.42-57.) The court sentenced Bly to a unified three-year sentence with the 
first year fixed and placed Bly on a two-year period of supervised probation. (R., 
pp.70-72.) Bly timely appealed. (R., pp.63-64, 86-87.) 
2 
ISSUE 
the on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Bly's motion to 
suppress? 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Bly failed to show that the district court erred in denying her 
suppression motion? 
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ARGUMENT 
Bly Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Denying Her Suppression 
Motion 
A Introduction 
Bly challenges the denial of her suppression motion, arguing as she did 
below that her detention "was not supported by reasonable, articulable 
suspicion." (Appellant's brief, p.8.) Bly's argument fails. The district court 
correctly applied the law to the facts in concluding she was lawfully detained 
pursuant reasonable suspicion based on the totality of the circumstances that 
criminal activity was afoot. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court defers 
to the trial court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous but exercises free 
review of the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional standards 
have been satisfied in light of the facts. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810, 
203 P.3d 1203, 1209 (2009); State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655,658, 152 P.3d 16, 
19 (2007). 
C. The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Concluding 
Bly's Detention Was Based On A Reasonable Suspicion That Criminal 
Activity Was Afoot 
Seizures of the person are evaluated under a Fourth Amendment 
standard of reasonableness. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 697-700 
(1981 ). Generally, any seizure of a person, whether by arrest or detention, must 
be supported by probable cause. Ji:L at 700; Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 
4 
200, 208 (1979). There are, however, certain exceptions to the probable cause 
requirement. example, it is well-settled that a police officer in 
compliance with the Fourth Amendment, make an investigatory stop of an 
individual if that officer entertains a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is 
underway. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968). "An investigative detention 
is permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts which justify suspicion 
that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal 
activity." State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 
2003) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 
(1981)). 
Bly argues that she could not be detained "simply because she was in the 
area where drug activity [was] suspected" or "simply because Detective Benson 
might have suspected that she knew Mr. Olmos because there is no criminal 
activity." (Appellant's brief, p.9.) Bly further argues that her detention was based 
on the detective's "suspicion" which was "simply a series of hunches 
unsupported by evidence." (Id.) For these reasons, Bly argues, her detention 
was "illegal because it was not supported by reasonable articulable suspicion 
that criminal activity was afoot" and, as such, "[t]he fruits of the search ... that 
followed the illegal detention must therefore be suppressed." (Appellant's brief, 
pp.8-9.) Bly's arguments fail. 
In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, the Court must 
consider the officer's training and experience and the reasonable inferences that 
can be drawn from the facts available to the officer. See United States v. Cortez, 
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449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) ("[A] trained officer draws inferences 
deductions - inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained 
person ... [T]he evidence ... must be seen and weighed not in terms of library 
analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law 
enforcement."); State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 180, 90 P.3d 926, 930 (Ct. App. 
2004) ("An officer may draw reasonable inferences from the facts in his or her 
possession, and those inferences may be drawn from the officer's experience 
and law enforcement training."); State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 613, 798 P .2d 
453, 458 (Ct. App. 1990) ("An officer's training and experience often play a role 
in pinpointing facts and circumstances that give rise to reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity afoot."). 
Here, the investigating detective did not simply have a hunch that this was 
an area with high drug activity or that Bly might be acquainted with someone who 
had an active arrest warrant. As the district court correctly concluded, the 
totality of the circumstances known to Detective Benson - including the history of 
the area itself, the activity taking place in and around the area, and Bly's 
connection to the vehicle registered to a suspect wanted for drug activity -
provided the officer, who was trained in drug interdiction (Tr., p.7, Ls.2-16), with 
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot: 
The issue then becomes as to whether or not this met the 
standards for an appropriate Terry stop. In Terry, the United States 
Supreme Court indicated, quote, "A police officer may stop or 
temporarily detain an individual for investigative purposes so long 
as the officer is aware of facts which allow him to reasonable 
conclude in light of his or her experience that criminal activity may 
be afoot." And Terry was recognized in State of Idaho versus 
Babb, a court of appeals [sic] case in Idaho in 2000. 
6 
To justify a Terry stop, the officer has to cite facts which lead 
to a reasonable articulable suspicion that crime may be afoot. The 
officer testified that they'd received evidence of drug trafficking 
the area of the Super 8 Motel. He testified that he saw a green 
sedan registered to Richard Olmos in the parking lot of the hotel. 
He had a legitimate right to look at the vehicles, to run checks on 
the vehicle license plates in the hotel. Upon doing that, he found 
that Mr. Olmos was the registered owner of that and he had a drug-
related warrant. 
He also saw three women in a vehicle that came, went 
inside the hotel, came out a short time later and left. That could 
have been innocent contact or conduct, but it also adds up to a 
reasonable suspicion that perhaps drug transactions were taking 
place under the officer's training and experience. 
I think he had a right to contact the defendant who was 
driving Mr. Olmos' vehicle, went in and looked into Mr. Olmos' 
vehicle and looked around and then went back in the hotel, came 
out later and - or actually moved the vehicle about 50 feet and 
came back later. 
I think that the officer had a reasonable suspicion that Mr. 
Olmos may have been in the area. And I think he had a 
reasonable basis for questioning the person that was involved, 
clearly involved with Mr. Olmos' vehicle to try to contact him. 
(Tr., p.44, L.15- p.46, L.6.) 
The court correctly viewed the facts known to the officer in their totality 
and in light of the officer's training and experience in determining the officer had 
reasonable suspicion to believe there was unlawful drug activity occurring in and 
around the Super 8 Motel as well as Bly's potential knowledge of a wanted 
suspect's whereabouts and as such, briefly detained Bly to determine whether or 
not she was involved in it drug activity or had information of criminal activity. 
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CONCLUSION 
state respectfully requests that this Court 
order denying Bly's motion to suppress. 
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